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Abstract: 
Inter municipal cooperation (IMC) represents a solution adopted all around the world in order to jointly provide 
services considering the complexity of contemporary socio-economic contexts. However, empirical evidence on IMC 
solutions is still week. The purpose of this paper is to analyse associations of municipalities (Unioni di Comuni, UC), 
the prevalent kind of IMC established in Italy, as a possible solution for sustainable public services delivery. Our 
research questions refer to the main features of Unioni di Comuni as an IMC for public services delivery in Emilia-
Romagna Region (Italy), to the explanation of those characteristics, and to the evaluation of UCs and their features 
in terms of autonomy, resilience and sustainability. In order to meet our objectives, we accomplished a cluster analysis, 
considering administrative and socio-economic data; in addition, we examined specific characteristics within each 
cluster to proceed with a comparison between clusters in terms of revenues from transfers from other governments 
layers, own revenues, current expenses and financial autonomy index in the last years. Our results suggest a general 
tendency: to provide services through UC in E-R; and to enhance their development in terms of public service special-
ization. But at the same time, UCs generally decreased their own financial autonomy, relying on transfers from other 
public institutions. In line with Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT), our empirical analysis finds different clusters of 
UCs which act as new centres for public service delivery in Emilia-Romagna Region in order to reduce uncertainty 
over resources through the creation of new inter-institutional balances. However, the statement that strong UCs com-
pensate weak starting territorial features of municipalities is not self-evident. 
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1 Introduction 
Recently, some changes occurred in the socio-economic environment all over the world – global 
financial crisis, the instability in the economic systems, in some cases some natural emergencies – 
which determined an increase of complexity for public sector action. Hence, sustainability and 
resilience, together with innovation, became key words and leitmotif in public sector literature and 
for public managers and policy-makers. 
All the above-mentioned factors contributed to a progressive reduction of the available resources, 
especially at local level. At the same time, they contributed to an increasing request of a higher 
level of intervention and adaptation of the contents of public services to the new requirements and 
needs of citizens and socio-economic stakeholders, also in terms of transparency and accountability 
of results (e.g. Andrews and Van de Walle 2013). Currently, those phenomena influence effective 
dynamics of public sector governance and management, considering also the reciprocal influence 
between them. Therefore, a context of great complexity affects public governance and manage-
ment, and this is particularly evident when focusing on public services design, organization, pro-
vision and delivery, especially at sub-national level. In fact, at local level the relationships between 
public entities, the citizens and other stakeholders are close and immediate, while resources and 
scale of action might not be adequate. So, service organization and provision might be particularly 
crucial. 
Among different resolutions adopted at sub-national level to provide local public services, Inter-
Municipal Cooperation (henceforth also IMC) is a consolidated and relevant settlement that is quite 
diffused both in Europe and North America. Literature, among other issues, is still evaluating and 
trying to measure efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of those initiatives (e.g. Allers and de 
Greef 2018; Blaeschke and Haug 2018) and the factors influencing their adoption and performance 
(e.g. Turrini et al. 2010; Voets at al. 2008). So, considering the complexity of the needs after crises 
and cutbacks policies, IMC represents a solution adopted to be resilient and to jointly provide ser-
vices in socio-economic contexts. 
This contribution refers the preliminary results of a research on IMC for public service delivery. In 
particular, we focus our attention on a specific kind of IMC that has been adopted in Italy, the 
Unioni di Comuni (associations of municipalities, henceforth also UCs). They have been first in-
troduced in 1990, and currently represent the main instrument of IMC in Italy, though their diffu-
sion is not uniform around the country. In effect, we concentrate our interest on a specific region, 
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Emilia-Romagna (henceforth also E-R), where those institutions are very diffused – actually 82.3 
% municipalities belong to a UC, while in Italy (only) 39.1% of them belong to a UC – and partic-
ularly supported by the regional governments. 
Thus, our purpose is to analyse this instrument as a possible resilient solution for autonomous, 
sustainable public services delivery, concentrating on the Italian region where they are more com-
mon in order to have a good sample of this phenomenon. In effect, UCs could be considered as an 
answer to: the progressive reduction of transfers from the national to local governments of the last 
decades, to different cutbacks initiatives applied after recent crises, but also to recover after some 
natural emergencies.5 In addition, to jointly exercise some public functions and deliver services, 
municipalities need to implement changes and innovations – institutional, organizational, but also 
procedural. Some exploratory studies started to evaluate the effects of mandatory IMC in small 
Italian municipalities (e.g. Giacomini et al. 2018), nevertheless more and deeper research is neces-
sary. So, our research questions refer to the main features of Unioni di Comuni as an Inter Munic-
ipal Cooperation for public services delivery in Emilia-Romagna Region, to the explanation of 
those characteristics, and to the evaluation of UCs and their features in terms of autonomy, sustain-
ability and resilience. More specifically, with the aim of answering to the last question, we decided 
to consider a Resource-Dependence Theory approach (RDT) (see Malatesta and Smith 2014; Davis 
and Cobb 2010; Hillman et al. 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). This theory can be useful to better 
understand not only the intergovernmental relations between UCs, the municipalities which de-
cided to create them and the regional (and national) governments; but also, and to partly explain 
the results of our empirical research on UCs in Emilia-Romagna Region.  
In order to meet our purposes, we realized a cluster analysis of the Unioni di Comuni in Emilia-
Romagna Region considering different demographic, socio-economic and administrative charac-
teristics. In this sense, cluster analysis allows us to identify typical features of IMCs all around the 
region. Moreover, we examined specific characteristics within each cluster to proceed with a com-
parison between clusters in terms of revenues from transfers, own revenues, current expenses and 
financial autonomy index in the last years. From the methodological point of view, the paper is 
based on both a qualitative and quantitative methodology. The instruments of research are: a liter-
ature review, a documental analysis (national and regional legislation, institutional reports from 
                                                 
5 Like the earthquake in 2012 or the floods in 2014 and in 2017 that affected this region. 
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the municipalities and IMC). In addition, as above mentioned, a cluster analysis has been realized 
using data from official databases and open data from national government, Emilia-Romagna Re-
gion and other public institutions. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives some remarks on the literature on 
Inter-Municipal Cooperation, whereas Section 3 contains our conceptual framework. In Section 4 
we will recall the Italian law regarding IMC, while Section 5 introduces the empirical methods 
used in the following section, which contains our cluster results. Section 7 provides insights into 
some financial indicators of Emilia-Romagna Region UCs, and Section 8 concludes. 
2 Public services revisited and the Inter-Municipal Cooperation 
Recently, the conception, creation and delivery of public services have become particularly critical 
in public sector governance and management. Thus, co-creation, co-production, collaborations and 
partnerships with citizens, public and private (both for profit and non-profit) actors, together with 
contracting-out and privatization concerning public services have become notable issues and very 
inspiring topics for both theory (e.g. Osborne 2018; Nabatchi et al. 2017; Osborne et al. 2016; 
Brandsen and Honingh 2016; Voorberg et al. 2015) and practice (e.g. Bason 2017; Durose and 
Richardson 2016). In addition, innovation seems essential to understand and analyse the dynamics 
of public sector management and governance, in particular when considering public services de-
livery and the relationships with citizens and stakeholders (e.g. De Vries et al. 2016; Osborne and 
Brown 2013; Bason 2010; Hartley 2005). At the same time, it is important to point out the increas-
ing diffusion and relevance of network solutions in policy-making, governance and in general in 
management issues (Kickert et al. 1997). Thus, the present conception of public service creation 
and delivery is based on networked-based relationships and instruments (e.g. Turrini et al. 2010). 
Networks solutions are particularly useful to achieve economies of scale and to reduce negative 
externalities. This is true considering sub-national governments, where the relationships between 
public entities, the citizens and other stakeholders are closer and immediate, while financial and 
material scale of action might be not optimal (McGuire and Agranoff 2011).  
In the last decades, and in particular after the crises, different academics and practitioners have 
tried to consider the main issues and success/defeat factors of reforms. Innovations and initiatives 
are necessary to put local governments in the conditions of better answering to local necessities: 
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among others, we can cite privatisations and reversal privatisations, dynamic markets management, 
different forms of contracting, amalgamation, mixed public/private service delivery agreements, 
and inter-municipal cooperation (e.g. Aldag and Warner 2018; Bel and Gradus 2018; Bel et al. 
2018; Kim 2018; Swianiewicz 2018). 
Among different resolutions adopted at sub-national level to provide local public services, inter-
municipal cooperation (IMC) for public service provision is a consolidated and relevant settlement 
that is quite diffused both in Europe and North America. Considering the complexity of socio-
economic contexts and cutbacks policies, IMC is a possible solution adopted to be resilient and to 
jointly provide sustainable and effective public services. Thus, IMC is also considered an answer 
to the limited and sub-optimal dimension of the administrative area in charge of municipalities. In 
addition, in countries with fragmented decentralized governments – like Italy – IMC could repre-
sent a response to “the challenge of regional coordination to address spill-overs and externalities 
of service delivery” (Bel et al. 2018: 175). Literature presents different notions (e.g Hulst et al. 
2009), forms and classification of IMC (e.g. Feiock and Scholz 2010). In this contribution, follow-
ing Steiner (2003) and Arn and Friederich (1994) we consider IMC as “the fulfilment of a public 
municipal task by two or more municipalities jointly or by third legal entity, whereby the task 
fulfilment simultaneously serves at least two municipalities and the participating municipalities 
participate directly (‘performing’) or indirectly (‘organizing’).” (Steiner 2003: 553). 
The interest on IMC in the academy increased especially in the last ten years, after the economic 
and financial crises. IMC has been considered in literatures on public administration, public man-
agement and public governance, respectively focusing on different issues. For instance, many con-
tributions offer different classifications of IMC: in terms of factors explaining their adoption (e.g. 
Kim 2018; Soukopová and Vaceková 2018) and their economic effects (e.g. Kim and Warner 
2016); in terms of the study of IMC through a policy-making perspective (e.g. Bel et al. 2018); or 
in terms of governance (e.g. Hulst et al. 2009; Sørensen 2007). Since several years, literature on 
IMC focused its interest on performance and on the conditions/dimensions for successful IMC (e.g. 
Turrini et al. 2010; Voets at al. 2008). For instance, Giacomini et al. (2018) summarized the con-
ditions under which IMC work well and can obtain good performance – higher efficiency and 
effectiveness in service delivery and higher legitimacy in negotiating and engaging with other gov-
ernmental entities – and used them to interpret the results of their research focused on an Italian 
case too.  
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Literature is still evaluating and trying to measure efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of 
IMC initiatives (e.g. Allers and de Greef 2018; Blaeschke and Haug 2018; Giacomini et al. 2018), 
nevertheless the results are not decisive. In effect, empirical researches (conducted through differ-
ent methodological instruments and approaches) usually suggest the possibility that IMC deter-
mines savings, better use of resources, improvements from economies of scale and the internaliza-
tion of some transaction costs. It seems to be able to also guarantee a better coordination of services 
provision and organization in a wider area, improvements in quality, effectiveness (wider office 
hours, standardisation of services). Nevertheless, according to some contributors, in some cases 
IMC can determine inefficiencies and a decrease of performance (see Feiock and Scholz 2010 and 
the “institutional collective actions dilemmas”). Finally, some critical issues in IMC could also 
concern transparency, accountability and institutional legitimacy, since those collaborations often 
give birth to second level institutions/initiatives which are not directly controlled by citizens and 
stakeholders. 
3 The conceptual framework 
The purpose of this contribution is to analyse a particular instrument of IMC adopted in Italy, i.e. 
Unioni di Comuni, as a possible resilient solution for autonomous, sustainable public services pro-
vision. Thus, we decided to start our analysis concentrating first on the Italian region (Emilia-
Romagna) where they are more common to have a better sample of this phenomenon. Our goal is 
to understand its use, and to start evaluating its activity in terms of autonomy and sustainability. 
Some exploratory studies started to evaluate the effects of mandatory IMC in small Italian munic-
ipalities (Giacomini et al. 2018), nevertheless more and deeper research is necessary. 
Therefore, our research questions are the following: (i) what are the main features of Unioni di 
Comuni, as an IMC for public services delivery in Emilia-Romagna Region? (ii) how to evaluate 
UCs and their features in terms of autonomy, resilience and sustainability? 
In order to answer especially to the last question, we decided to consider a Resource-Dependence 
Theory approach (RDT) (see Malatesta and Smith 2014; Davis and Cobb 2010; Hillman et al. 
2009; Pfeffer and Salancik 2003). RDT originated in the 1970s and concerns how an organisation’s 
behaviour is affected by dependence on the external resources which the organisation refers to. 
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RDT suggests that resource scarcity, not necessarily efficiency, motivates organisational action 
(Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Leblebici et al. 1991).  
RDT is based on the following propositions: (i) organisations are constrained by a network of in-
terdependencies with other organisations. (ii) organisations adopt strategies to reduce their depend-
ency on other organisations’ resources in their environment. (iii) these dependencies produce inter-
organisational and intra-organisational power relations (Pfeffer 1987; Ulrich and Barney 1984). 
Power is the inverse of dependence, which means that the balance of power favours the organisa-
tion that has influence over resources needed by other organisations. This is fitting with the situa-
tion of the UCs in Italy which seem to be financially dependent on transfers from the municipalities, 
the regional government and sometimes also from the national government. In this research, after 
the creation of a taxonomy of UCs, we will verify their level of dependence from other govern-
ments through an analysis of own revenues, of the financial autonomy index, and of current ex-
penditures. RDT also affirms that another possible strategy to reduce the uncertainty and the inter-
dependence from other entities is to form an inter-organisational alliance with the source of con-
straint. This is what happens between UCs and municipalities, and also between UCs and the re-
gional governments, creating public interest networks for public services provision. However, ac-
cording to Malatesta and Smith (2014: 19), alliances and agreements only provide partial absorp-
tion of interdependencies, thus allowing affiliated organisations to maintain greater organisational 
autonomy. Finally, through the exercise of political power, organisations actively attempt to influ-
ence the conditions (e.g. legislation) of the external institutional environment. Hence, this theory 
can be useful to better understand not only the intergovernmental relations between Unioni di Co-
muni, the municipalities which decided to create them, and the regional (and national) govern-
ments; but also, it can help to partly explain the results of our empirical research on UCs in Emilia-
Romagna Region in terms of autonomy, resilience and sustainability. 
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4 The setting. Inter-Municipal Cooperation for public services delivery in It-
aly 
In Italy, the discussion between policy-makers about IMC started about 30 years ago. Afterwards, 
it received more or less attention, but it became particularly relevant in political discourse again 
recently, especially after some initiatives of the national government aiming to improve efficiency 
and austerity of public sector entities, through for instance Spending Review-inspired initiatives.  
Currently, in Italy there are 7,915 municipalities,6 about 70 percent of them (69.5%) are “small 
municipalities” with less than 5,000 inhabitants, where around 16.3% (about 10 million) of the 
Italian population (60.5 million) live. Italian municipalities are particularly important for the local 
socio-economic context since they are the main providers of public services to citizens and local 
enterprises. In addition, they are the main funders for the creation of infrastructures for service 
provision and for supporting local economic systems. Usually, in this country, municipalities are 
in charge of offering several services through different kind of agencies and/or instruments. These 
are: social services (in partnership and complementarily with the health services provided by local 
health agencies), education (e.g. nurseries, kindergartens but also music conservatories), services 
supporting education and schools (e.g. transport, canteens), urban planning and regeneration, waste 
collection and disposal, water, gas and electricity supply, local transportation, local police, services 
to firms, and leisure services (e.g. theatres, cinemas, museums, swimming pools, gyms). So, local 
authorities of limited dimension can struggle serious problems in terms of both effectiveness and 
efficiency of public services provision within their administrative area of competence, especially 
after the recent crises and the cutbacks initiatives at national level. Thus, IMC can represent a good 
solution in order to provide enhanced services and to better use their resources. 
Among different kind of IMC for public services delivery based on the creation of public networks, 
the more common in Italy are: Unioni di Comuni (Associations of municipalities), and Convenzioni 
(Agreements). Convenzioni are simply some contractual agreements involving two or more local 
authorities and aiming to regulate the cooperation for the delivery of public services. Therefore, 
they are quite flexible and not particularly difficult to establish. On the other hand, UCs are much 
more demanding: they consist in the creation of a new local authority, endowed with legal and 
                                                 
6 Source: Comuniverso-Ancitel from ISTAT 01/01/2019 (consulted on 27/03/2019): 
http://www.comuniverso.it/index.cfm?Piccoli_Comuni_sotto5000_ab&menu=590. 
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political powers similar to a municipality. Thus, they are much more binding also from a political 
point of view. 
Unioni di Comuni have been first introduced in 1990, through the Law n.142/1990 which proposed 
them as an instrument aiming to the final merger of municipalities. Consequently, for about ten 
years the UCs were not broadly adopted by municipalities. Afterwards, the legislator abandoned 
the reference to compulsory merger (Law 265/1999), and encouraged the adoption of IMC for 
service delivery as a solution to the small dimension of many Italian municipalities and to the 
fragmentation of local governments system, also offering financial incentives to their adoption 
(Legislative decree 267/2000 and some directives from Ministries). Afterwards, since 2010, several 
legislative interventions7 started forcing small municipalities, usually those with less than 5,000 
inhabitants8 to the joint provision of public services through IMC of some core tasks/areas of ser-
vice called funzioni (functions or tasks).9 10The law was accompanied by a schedule of the number 
of tasks/services to be jointly provided and the deadlines to be followed. Hence, the so-called 
Spending Review 2 Law imposed to small municipalities to provide through IMC a list of 
funzioni.11 Lastly, the Law 56/2014 tried to go ahead with the redefinition of the framework of 
responsibilities and competencies between different governments and public sector institutions at 
sub-national level. Among other objectives,12 this law gave great space to the Unioni di Comuni as 
an instrument of IMC able to guarantee efficiency and the rational dimension in the organization 
and delivery of public services, since it takes into account the local identity and social capital. 
Furthermore, according to this law, UCs are today the only instrument of IMC accepted for the 
provision of the core tasks/areas of service (funzioni fondamentali) apart from the last one (10).13 
                                                 
7 E.g. Law Decree 78/2010; Law 122/2010; Law 111/2011; Law 148/2011 and the Law 135/2012 also called Spending 
review 2. 
8 Or 3,000 inhabitants if the municipality belongs to a mountain area and to a consortium of mountain municipalities. 
9 According to the law from 6 to 10. 
10 Nevertheless, last January 2019 the Constitutional Court partly contested the among mentioned obligation and 
opened to some exceptions under specific circumstances.  
11 1) organization of general administration, financial management, accounting and control; 2) organization of public 
services of general interest (e.g. welfare, transport, energy/water provision…); 3) land register management (apart 
from national responsibilities); 4) urban and housing planning also at supra-municipal level; 5) civil protection and 
coordination of recovery activities; 6) management of waste collection and disposal (and tax collection); 7) local social 
services (planning, management and delivery); 8) school buildings construction (local competences), schools services 
planning and management (transport, canteens); 9) municipal and local police; 10) registry services, electoral and 
statistics offices management (apart from national responsibilities). 
12 For instance, the role of metropolitan cities, the reduction of responsibilities and powers of provinces. 
13 Whose deadlines were postponed. 
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In addition, there have been many financial incentives in favour of UCs, both at national and re-
gional level.14 For instance, Emilia-Romagna Region plays and important role in the promotion of 
IMC and UCs (Regional Law 21/2012) and gave many incentives to UCs, mergers and definition 
of the optimal range of intervention for (joint) public services delivery (e.g. Regional Law 
n.15/2016). 
Currently, even though UCs represent the main instrument of IMC in Italy, their diffusion is not 
uniform around the country. Indeed, while in Italy (only) 39.1% of municipalities (3,094 out of 
7,915) belong to an Unione di Comuni, in Emilia-Romagna Region the percentage is 82.3 (270 
municipalities out of 328). In this Region, UCs are more common than in the rest of Italy, apart 
from Valle d’Aosta, a region with special status, where 73 of the 74 municipalities belong to an 
UC.15 
4.1 A focus on Unioni di Comuni in Emilia-Romagna Region 
In order to better analyse Unioni di Comuni as an IMC instrument for public service organization 
and delivery, we decided to concentrate our analysis on the region where UCs are largely diffused 
and particularly supported by the regional government. 
As stated above, in Emilia-Romagna Region UCs are very common and have quite a long history, 
but they are rather heterogeneous in their features. Currently, there are 42 UCs in E-R.16 These are 
quite homogenously distributed (apart from some parts of the Parma province) both in the flat and 
in the mountain areas, and usually the main towns are excluded from them.17 Generally, the UCs 
situated in the mountain areas have been established later than those in the flat area, due to the 
compliance to the Law (2013) requiring to transform the consortia of mountain municipalities (Co-
munità Montane) into UCs. Nevertheless, in general IMCs for services delivery have quite a long 
tradition in E-R, due to the existence of cooperation between municipalities far before the creation 
of UCs as formal institutions. In effect, the average age of the UCs is more than 8 years and many 
municipalities started their IMC through agreements back in the 1990s. 
                                                 
14 For instance, the possibility to overcome the temporary block of turn-over of civil servants. 
15 Data refer to 01/01/2019. 
16 Nevertheless, in our analysis we decided to consider 44 UCs since our data are collected until 31/12/2017. 
17 Capoluoghi di provincia (provincial capitals) are the main towns with administrative responsibilities over an admin-
istrative area called Provincia. The re-organization of sub-national governments and responsibilities aim at reducing 
as much as possible their powers. 
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The number of public services jointly provided through this IMC instrument is in general high: in 
some cases, it is more than 10, but it depends from case to case. The relevant number of services 
provided jointly through the IMC can have a significant impact on the budget (or financial reports) 
of a UC. Piazza (2017), for instance, compares the amount of current expenses among UCs and the 
municipalities which belong to them, and shows that in general a great number of funzioni offered 
through the UC drives to a huge weight on the UC current expenses, especially among the UCs 
with longer history, playing as governance broker of services delivery among municipalities. Nev-
ertheless, this tendency is not always demonstrated. In effect, it depends also on some features of 
the socio-economical background, and on the history of the IMC itself. 
Finally, it is relevant to highlight that UCs are a second level public institutions, since their repre-
sentatives are not directly elected by the population but chosen from the municipalities’ ones ac-
cording to the national/regional law and the statute of each UC. Thus, some criticalities in account-
ability and governance of inter-municipal relationships and in public services organization and 
delivery are possible. Hence, the attitude and the historical tendency to networked governance 
through IMC is for instance relevant. In those cases, citizens seem not to care much about whom 
is effectively providing a service, but on the quality and effectiveness of it18. 
5 Methodology and data collection 
In this study, cluster analysis is adopted for its partitioning ability, in order to obtain an exploratory 
classification of the association of municipalities in Emilia-Romagna Region. Since we did not 
start with theoretical assumptions regarding the number of clusters we aimed to obtain, we firstly 
adopted a hierarchical approach which enables to choose the correct number of clusters in our 
analysis. Next, we proceeded with a non-hierarchical analysis to refine our results by allowing the 
switching of cluster membership.19 Our population of interest is composed by all the existing 
                                                 
18 See for instance Pattaro and Ranuzzini analysis (2017) on the role of UC in the recovery from the earthquake of 
2012 in Emilia-Romagna region. 
19 According to Hair et al. (2014), the “advantages of one approach can compensate for the weaknesses or the other” 
(p. 446). Indeed, following the authors, this hierarchical and non-hierarchical mix of approaches is considered the most 
complete way to proceed in a cluster analysis. 
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Unioni di Comuni, in Emilia-Romagna Region at the end of 2017. The dataset consists of 44 ob-
servations. Since our purpose is to consider different characteristics of the area of interest, we se-
lected a set of starting socio-economic and administrative variables. The complete list of initial 
variables at association of municipalities level is presented on Table 1, while on Table 2, we show 
descriptive statistics for each variable employed in the analysis. Variables have been collected from 
different sources and refer to years 2015-2018.20  
Table 1 – Initial variables at UCs level, by year of reference and source 
Variables Description  Year Source 
Total population Resident population  2017 
Emilia 
Romagna 
Statistics 
Area Land area (in square kilometers) 2017 
Density Total population divided by land area 2017 
Functions attributed to UC 
Number of functions attributed by municipalities to 
each association 
2017 
Employees Number of employees in manufacturing and services 2015 
% Foreigners Ratio of foreigners to total population 2017 
Anci* 
Number of municipalities Number of municipalities which are part of each UC 2017 
Total income Sum of total gross income of the population 2018 Mef** 
% Population over 65 Ratio of the over 65 years old to the total population 2017 Istat*** 
* National Association of Italian Municipalities, via Comuniverso website 
** Ministry of Economy and Finance, via Mef website 
*** Italian National Institute of Statistics, via I.Stat website 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Table 2 – Descriptive statistics: PCA initial variables, mean values 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 
Total population 59,303 38,765.8 
Area 398.2 234.8 
Density 170.4 95.0 
Functions attributed to UC 6.9 2.8 
Employees 18,930 14,650.2 
Foreigners* 10.4 2.6 
Number of municipalities 6.6 2.5 
Total income (thousands) 911,460 92,359.6 
Population over 65* 24.2 3.9 
* Percentages 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
                                                 
20 Links to the websites we used to gather the data can be found in Section 10 at the end of the article. 
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Data from Table 2 suggest that, in E-R, on average, the associations of municipalities have a mean 
population of 59,300 inhabitants, the percentage of population over 65 years old is 24%, UCs have 
an average extension of 398 square kilometres, with a density of 170 inhabitants per square kilo-
metres. If we consider administrative characteristics, the UCs of Emilia-Romagna are composed 
by more than 6 municipalities on average, and each municipality decided to jointly provide almost 
7 services/functions through the UC. In this assessment we considered only the core tasks/areas of 
services (see previous paragraph) provided by all the municipalities belonging to the UC. In addi-
tion, total income in each UC is 911 million euros on average, 10% of the inhabitants were for-
eigners in 2017, and the average number of companies’ employees per UC was 19,000 in 2015. 
Due to different scale and magnitude of the input values, we decided to standardize each variable. 
Moreover, as shown on Table A1 in the Appendix, in many cases there is a strong correlation 
between variables; this is a problem in key driver analysis because when two independent variables 
are highly correlated, it becomes difficult to accurately partial out their individual impact on the 
dependent variable (Sambandam 2003). Hence, in a cluster analysis perspective, we had to include 
only cluster variables that are not highly correlated. In our study, this means that multicollinearity 
does not allow to cluster directly input variables. Therefore, to solve this problem, we chose to 
proceed with an ex-ante Principal Component Analysis (PCA) in order to summarize our data into 
distinctive factors. Through PCA method, we extracted the important information from the table 
in order to represent it as a set of new orthogonal variables called principal components, and this 
procedure enables to display the pattern of similarity of the observations and of the variables (Abdi 
and Williams 2010). Considering our initial variables, practical reasons dictate that 3 or 4 compo-
nents would be the best. The idea to retain factors with eigenvalues greater than 1, combined with 
the scree-test, indicates that 3 components are appropriate (Table A2 and Figure A1 in the Appen-
dix).21 Hence, in conclusion, we obtained three different components related to different features 
of our data (the correlation of each initial variable with the components can be found in Table A3 
in the Appendix). The 3 factors represent the 80% of the total variance and they are: 
1. Economic and administrative dynamism; 
2. Territorial Weakness and Extension; 
3. Administrative Complexity. 
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After the Principal Component Analysis, we used the hierarchical clustering procedures to examine 
a complete range of cluster solutions, aiming to obtain a preliminary set of clusters and checking 
the presence of outliers in the population. Firstly, we used Euclidean distance as a measure of 
similarity between observations. Euclidean distance is the most commonly recognized measure of 
distance, many times referred to as straight-line distance. After this estimation, in order to deter-
mine the similarity between subsequent cluster options, Ward’s clustering algorithm was used, 
merging the pair of clusters at each step of the hierarchical procedure which minimizes the within-
cluster variance, while maximising the between-cluster one (Hair et al. 2014). We then analysed 
the range of solutions through non-hierarchical cluster analysis to define the final cluster option. 
In this phase, defining in advance the final number of clusters, we used K-means as clustering 
algorithm which works through an optimizing procedure allowing for reassignment of observations 
till the most distinct clusters are obtained. 
Since our research had mainly an exploratory goal, we did not know the number of clusters we 
needed to obtain in advance, and the hierarchical approach does not need to specify it previously. 
On the other hand, the second step (non-hierarchical cluster analysis) allows to find the optimal 
solution and is less susceptible to outliers in the data. So, in the second step, after an initial set of 
“seeds” predetermined by the researcher (one for each cluster), all individual observations (UCs) 
were assigned to the nearest cluster seed (Mazzocchi 2008). We used the clusters’ means from the 
hierarchical procedure as the starting group centres (the “seeds”) in the non-hierarchical determi-
nation of cluster. In this way, we obtained our final cluster solution. 
6 Cluster analysis results and comments 
Figure 1 shows the hierarchical cluster output plotted in a dendrogram. It is a tree graph in which 
each observation (each Unione di Comuni) starts on the left as a separate cluster. It graphically 
shows how the clusters are grouped at each step until they are all merged in a single cluster in the 
right-hand side of the graph (Hair et al. 2014). The choice of the final number of clusters depended 
on empirical investigation and researchers’ conceptual considerations. The aim was to combine 
observations by introducing only small amount of heterogeneity within cluster at each step but 
maximizing the difference between clusters. 
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We used Duda-Hart index as a stopping rule (Duda et al. 2012), one of the most common indices 
used to determine the optimum number of clusters (Halpin 2016). In Duda-Hart index, an index 
value is computed for each cluster solution and larger values indicate more distinct clustering so-
lution (see Table A4 in the Appendix for the complete list of values of the Duda-Hart index). The 
conventional rule is to find the largest value of the Je (2)/Je (1) which corresponds to low value of 
the pseudo T-squared (with higher value above and below it). 
 
Figure 1 – Dendrogram 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
In our case, values suggested a good classification for a 7-clusters solution that is a good trade-off 
between homogeneity within clusters and an adequate differentiation among them. We found that 
one of our 7 clusters counts a single component (Unione dei Comuni della Romagna Forlivese). 
We know that hierarchical methods are very sensitive to the presence of outliers. We dropped out 
the outlier since it is not of interest to retain cluster with a single member, and 6 clusters remained. 
Through the non-hierarchical cluster analysis, we were able to display the list of different UCs 
classified by cluster (Table A5 in the Appendix), while Figure 2 compares the mean values of the 
three components used as clustering variables. As the figure shows, Cluster 5 and specially Cluster 
4 report values below the mean of the first component, Economic and administrative dynamism, 
while they present the highest values for the Territorial Weakness and Extension component. In 
the third component, Administrative Complexity, Cluster 4 shows a negative value and Cluster 5 a 
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positive one. Cluster 1 and 2 maintain low values both on the first and on the second component. 
They are not similar compared to the third variable: Cluster 1 is below the mean, Cluster 2 reports 
the highest value among all clusters. Cluster 3 and 6 present the most negative point estimate in 
the second variable. 
Figure 2 –PCA components values, by cluster 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
However, while Cluster 6 is characterized by positive values of both Economic Background and of 
Administrative Complexity, Cluster 3 presents a negative value for the Administrative complexity 
component only. Starting from these general insights, we conducted a first exploratory profiling of 
the 6 clusters: 
- Cluster 1, Unlucky pioneers: we note that most of these UCs are among the first that exper-
imented this form of Inter-Municipal Cooperation. Each statistic showed is below the re-
gional average. 
- Cluster 2, Cozy suburbs: this cluster is peripheral from an economic point of view with 
respect to the most dynamic clusters (3 and 6). On average, the municipalities of this cluster 
attributed more functions to the UCs than the regional level, and they show the lowest val-
ues of Territorial weakness and extension components. 
- Cluster 3, Small good performers: this cluster is characterized by very low values of Ad-
ministrative Complexity and Territorial Weakness and Extension components. These UCs 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Economic and Administrative
Dynamism
Territorial Weakness and
Extension
Administrative Complexity
Cluster 1
Cluster 2
Cluster 3
Cluster 4
Cluster 5
Cluster 6
 18 
present a high number of employees and the density is the highest in the region. Considering 
average income, this cluster is richer than Cluster 6, but the total income is lower. 
- Cluster 4, Sleeping beauties: This cluster presents young UCs with few municipalities, with 
a low population density, and with the lowest number of functions. Other traits of these 
UCs do not emerge, so, we choose to call this cluster as the protagonist of the famous fairy 
tale. 
- Cluster 5, Hardship on the mountains: associations in this cluster are mainly situated in the 
mountain areas of the region, including small towns with a specific administrative history 
of inter-municipality far before the constitution of the UCs (e.g. already existing consortia 
of mountain municipalities). These territories present administrative features characterised 
by a complex governance of the territory and a very high Territorial Weakness and Exten-
sion. 
- Cluster 6, Ideal types: this cluster includes institutions with the highest Economic Back-
ground features, and average Territorial Weakness and Extension and Administrative Com-
plexity components. These UCs represent the ideal Emilia-Romagna local government, with 
a high level of wealth and urbanisation, a large presence of industrial activity and a well-
established administrative history. In effect many of the municipalities of this cluster expe-
rienced forms of inter-municipal cooperation for service delivery far before the existence 
of UCs as institutions (e.g. agreements, as we outlined in Section 4). 
Figure 3 provides the map with the territorial distribution of the 6 clusters in the region, while Table 
3 presents descriptive statistics for our cluster solution. As above claimed, Figure 3 shows that 
Cluster 1 (Unlucky pioneers) and Cluster 4 (Sleeping beauties), characterized by low economic 
performance, are located in the corners of our region (respectively, North-West and South-East the 
former, South-West and North-East the latter), while Cluster 3 contains UCs located in the core 
part of the region (which we can broadly identify referring to the ancient “Via Emilia” that is a sort 
of “backbone” of the region).22 
 
 
                                                 
22 Via Emilia is the ancient Roman way which connected in a straight line the main Roman towns of the Region from 
West (Placentia- Piacenza) to East (Ariminum- Rimini). 
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Figure 3 – Clusters’ territorial distribution 
Note: borders identify E-R municipalities, whereas different colours identify different clusters of UCs. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Considering the number of UCs, Cluster 2 (Cozy suburbs) is the smallest cluster and it is localized 
in the West part of the region. Cluster 5 and 6 are located in various provinces in the Center and 
East part of the region, but Cluster 5 is mostly present in mountain areas. 
With reference to population, the least populous clusters are the ones we labelled Cozy suburbs and 
Sleeping Beauties, respectively with 23,300 and 20,100 inhabitants on average per UC. The clusters 
with the highest average value of population per UC are Cluster 3 (Small good performers) and 
Cluster 6 (Ideal types), with 65,999 and 97,469 inhabitants on average. UCs labelled Hardship on 
the mountains have the widest territories but the second lowest density, and this explains their high 
value of the Territorial weakness and extension component. On the contrary, Cluster 3 Small good 
performers shares a high population with Ideal types, but in a smaller territorial area. 
Not surprisingly, the variable indicating the average number of employees in services and manu-
facturing per UC shows the highest value in the cluster Ideal types (34,104 employees on average), 
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followed by the Small good performers. These clusters are also the richest in terms of total income, 
while the poorest are the Sleeping beauties. Average income is smooth among clusters, but Small 
good performers show the highest value. Cluster 4 (Sleeping beauties) shows the lowest value 
(fewer than 4,000) in terms of average industry and services’ employees per UCs, and shares eco-
nomic fragility also with UCs labelled Hardship on the mountain and with Unlucky pioneers, as it 
is shown by the low average income and the high percentages of elderly people. 
Table 3 - Descriptive statistics by cluster, mean values and percentages 
Variables 
Cluster 
Total 
Unlucky 
pioneers 
Cozy  
suburbs 
Small good 
performers 
Sleeping 
beauties 
Hardship 
on the 
mountains 
Ideal types 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Total population 31,329 23,292 65,999 20,107 55,293 97,469 59,303 
Area 229.6 183.1 272.9 475.2 666.9 423.2 398.2 
Density 146.7 146.6 248.2 45.7 84.4 247.5 170.4 
Functions attributed to 
UC 
6.3 7.4 5.1 4.5 7.5 9.2 6.9 
Age 11.2 6.4 9.9 5.2 5.5 9.9 8.3 
Municipalities <1,000 
per UC* 
4.7 5.0 0.0 16.7 6.7 0.0 4.7 
Number of municipali-
ties per UC 
5.8 3.8 6.0 5.8 7.8 7.6 6.6 
Employees 8,359 13,840 22,018 3,983 9,199 34,104 18,930 
Foreigners* 8.9 14.3 10.3 7.2 9.5 11.7 10.4 
Population over 65* 22.3 22.2 21.7 32.0 25.7 23.0 24.2 
Total income (000) 493,791 373,356 1,052,295 267,284 790,380 1,515,367 911,460 
Average income 21,587 21,314 22,184 18,000 19,081 21,445 20,781 
Number of UC 6 5 9 6 6 11 44 
* Percentages 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
We consider now administrative variables. The number of municipalities per UC is very similar in 
every cluster. However, Cozy suburbs of Cluster 2 contain the lowest number of municipalities per 
UC (3.8) on average, and Cluster 5 and 6 show the highest number (7.8 and 7.6). If we consider 
the functions attributed to UCs, Cluster 3 and Cluster 4 show the lowest values: however, Small 
good performers of Cluster 3 contain older UCs than Sleeping beauties of Cluster 4. Moreover, 
Cluster 3 has no municipalities under 1,000 inhabitants in its UCs, with respect to Cluster 4, which 
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shows the highest value of small municipalities among clusters. Unlucky pioneers, Small good 
performers and Ideal types contain the oldest UCs. 
If we consider some demographic indicators, clusters with the highest number of foreigners are the 
Cozy suburbs, the Small good performers and the Ideal types. The oldest population is in Cluster 4 
(Sleeping beauties), and Cluster 5 which mainly contains mountain territories. Other clusters are 
similar to each other and they all have between 21% and 23% of the population over 65 years old. 
In summary, Ideal types (Cluster 6) show the strongest economic capacity, together with solid 
administrative features. They are old UCs, and present the highest number of functions attributed 
to UCs by member municipalities. “Via Emilia” UCs, i.e. Small good performers (Cluster 3), get 
in second position from an economic point of view, and are similar to Cluster 6 considering demo-
graphic characteristics (high population and high percentage of foreigners), but they are located in 
smaller areas. From and administrative point of view, they are as old as components of Cluster 6; 
however, these UCs jointly exert fewer function than their “older brothers”. Cozy suburbs (Cluster 
2) are immediately after Cluster 3 and 6 in terms of economic features. Placed in the West part of 
the region, they are the smallest cluster considering the number of UCs, and with the lowest number 
of municipalities per UC. Located in peripheral areas of the region, Sleeping beauties (Cluster 4) 
show administrative fragility since they are the youngest, with small municipalities and the lowest 
number of functions jointly exerted by UCs. Hardship on the mountain (Cluster 5) are the widest 
territories, they present economic and demographic fragility and show the highest number of mu-
nicipalities per UC, with a high number of functions jointly exerted. In peripheral areas, we find 
also Unlucky pioneers (Cluster 1), which are on average the oldest UCs of the region; however, 
they do not rank the highest in terms of administrative features and share economic fragility with 
Cluster 4 and 5. 
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7 Analysis of UCs financial dimensions and discussion 
Do clusters differ in terms of capacity to provide services and goods? More specifically, do they 
differ in terms of autonomy, resilience and sustainability? The answer to these questions is the goal 
of this section, which uses financial indicators of the UCs as a proxy of governmental capacity.  
In Section 6, we demonstrated how UCs can be grouped together in networks of organisations with 
similar administrative and socio-economic features. These networks try to manage inter-organisa-
tional interdependences, as the RDT approach described in Section 3 highlights. Here, we analyse 
whether different patterns of dependence of UCs among clusters do emerge. 
Table 4 – UCs financial indicators at regional level, average values per year 
Year 
Revenues from 
transfers 
Extra-Tax Revenues Current Expenditures 
Financial 
Autonomy 
Total 
Number of 
UCs per Year 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
% 
2005 75.8 61.0 49.5 59.1 127.0 110.4 34.0 5 
2006 64.0 75.9 42.0 54.2 105.2 115.8 33.7 8 
2007 89.5 92.3 50.9 63.0 139.7 129.4 32.8 9 
2008 88.7 110.9 46.2 68.4 134.5 156.4 28.5 17 
2009 78.3 100.4 33.1 49.9 109.4 133.1 31.9 22 
2010 87.4 96.1 29.3 47.3 114.8 127.2 22.0 23 
2011 90.4 102.6 28.8 45.6 118.0 130.3 21.5 25 
2012 99.3 105.0 29.0 43.7 125.9 131.5 20.7 25 
2013 113.0 111.2 27.9 38.0 140.4 129.1 19.2 34 
2014 118.8 105.9 33.2 44.6 146.0 124.2 19.4 44 
2015 129.3 106.2 32.6 41.3 152.0 122.6 19.1 44 
2016 150.9 112.1 37.7 44.2 181.0 146.1 18.7 44 
2017 155.0 101.2 35.9 29.9 180.6 113.3 19.5 44 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Table 4 shows average trends of: transfers from public entities (municipalities constituting UCs, 
Province, Region and national State), own revenues (called extra-tax revenues in Italian)23 and 
current expenses, of the UCs in Emilia-Romagna Region. Data refer to a span of time of 13 years, 
                                                 
23 Those revenues are generated by fees from the use of public services and infrastructures, and income from public 
assets. 
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considering the financial statements between 2005 and 2017.24 In the remaining part of the para-
graph, all values are expressed in Euros per inhabitants, unless otherwise stated. 
As the table shows, the number of associations of municipalities hugely increased in the last 13 
years.25 These financial values can well describe the evolution of UCs in the long run (see Figure 
4). Mean current expenditures increased over time and are used as a proxy for UCs volume of 
activity. Over time, municipalities have attributed to UCs, on average, an increasing number of 
services and activities/responsibilities. On the other hand, own revenues can be used as a proxy for 
the ability to use own resources to manage activities, and they did not increase over time on aver-
age. 
Figure 4 – Trends in UCs financial indicators at regional level, 2005-2017 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Transfers represent the UCs funding from other public sector institutions and agents, and they show 
a trend similar to current expenditures. On average, transfers and funding to UCs increased over 
time as the responsibilities and services in charge of the Unioni di Comuni increased. 
Figure 4 graphically shows these trends, and adds to the picture the financial autonomy indicator, 
which is the ratio of tax and extra-tax revenues to the sum of all current revenues (tax revenues, 
                                                 
24 We decided not to consider revenues from taxes since UCs generally are not in charge of own taxes. 
25 We could not find financial data from all the associations of our population even if we have a high coverage during 
years; inactive UCs do not provide budgets and financial statements, and in addition in some cases some values are 
missing. 
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extra-tax revenues and transfers). For each UC, it is a proxy for the capacity to use own resources, 
considering all revenues and transfers. 
The financial autonomy indicator (right vertical axis) decreases over time (from 34% to 19%). 
Figure 4 shows the increasing financial dimension of UCs, their increasing dependence from fund-
ing, and their decreasing autonomy over time.  
The following step is analyzing these financial values by cluster, in order to decompose these trends 
by territorial features. Table 5 compares revenues from transfers by cluster in the last 5 available 
years.26 On average, mean transfers increase for all cluster over years, and Cluster 1 (Unlucky pio-
neers) shows the highest increase (more than 200% comparing years 2013 and 2017). 
Table 5 – UCs revenues from transfers 2013-2017, average values per cluster 
Year 
Cluster 
F P-Value Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2013 25.7 233.2 66.6 133.9 52.8 174.4 3.06 0.029 113.0 
2014 27.6 156.7 77.2 179.3 95.9 193.7 3.22 0.018 118.8 
2015 42.5 191.7 83.4 103.4 121.0 198.0 2.60 0.044 129.3 
2016 84.0 235.4 103.2 139.9 110.7 224.3 2.80 0.032 150.9 
2017 83.0 228.4 91.8 154.5 115.3 256.1 6.25 0.000 155.0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Clusters are effective in discriminating the mean value of transfers between groups of UCs over 
years, since F-Statistics are significant at least at 5% in the period considered. Cluster 2 (Cozy 
Suburbs) and Cluster 6 (Ideal Types) show the highest values of this variable. More specifically, 
for all years considered, Cluster 6 has higher values of mean transfers with respect to Cluster 1 (t-
test significant at 10% in 2013, 5% in 2014-2016 and 1% in 2017) and Cluster 3 (Small good 
performers) (t-test significant at 10% in 2013, 2015 and 2017, 5% in 2014 and 2016). In the last 2 
years, Cluster 6 shows statistically significant differences (significance at 5% level) also with re-
spect to Cluster 5 (Hardship on the mountains). Also, Cluster 2 shows higher differences with 
respect to the same clusters in all years (with the exception of year 2016, where differences are not 
statistically significant).27  
                                                 
26 The choice to consider only the last 5 years is related to the great increase of UCs in the same period of time, 
especially after some legislative interventions at national and regional level and the institution of more financial in-
centives to the constitution of UCs. See Section 4 for more details. 
27 Significance of t-test: with reference to Cluster 1: 5% in 2014, 2015 and 2017; 1% in 2013. With reference to Cluster 
3: 10% in 2014 and 2015; 5% in 2017; 1% in 2013. With reference to Cluster 5: 5% in 2017. 
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Table 6 – UCs extra-tax revenues 2013-2017, average values per cluster 
Year 
Cluster 
F P-Value Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2013 7.4 31.0 35.1 49.4 8.6 35.7 0.54 0.747 27.9 
2014 7.1 39.4 38.0 91.7 20.4 36.3 1.74 0.153 33.2 
2015 12.8 30.3 43.2 27.5 16.8 46.8 0.71 0.623 32.6 
2016 13.8 74.6 24.4 34.9 36.1 46.7 1.30 0.288 37.7 
2017 17.5 39.1 26.9 37.0 36.2 52.0 1.19 0.337 35.9 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Table 6 provides estimates for extra-tax revenues. Only Cluster 1, Cluster 5 and Cluster 6 show 
increasing mean values whereas other clusters present fuzzy trends. In this case, clusters do not 
provide a clear discrimination between UCs over years (F-Statistics are not significant). 
Clusters show also distinctions with respect to mean current expenditures over years, as it can be 
seen from Table 7. Again, average expenditures constantly increase for Cluster 1, Cluster 5 and 
Cluster 6, whereas Cluster 2 and Cluster 6 show the highest values. Cluster 6 has statistically sig-
nificant higher values than Cluster 1 in all years considered, and increasing differences with respect 
to Cluster 3 and Cluster 5.28 High volumes of mean current expenditures can be seen also for Cluster 
3 (Small good performers) and 4 (Sleeping beauties). Cluster 1 presents the smallest values but, at 
the same time, the highest increase over years (from €33.9 in 2013 to €95.9 in 2017). 
Table 7 – UCs current expenditures 2013-2017, average values per cluster 
Year 
Cluster 
F P-Value Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2013 33.9 261.8 100.0 175.0 70.2 208.2 2.48 0.062 140.4 
2014 33.5 188.5 112.1 247.7 109.0 224.9 3.29 0.016 146.0 
2015 49.7 212.1 116.9 115.4 134.6 232.9 2.36 0.062 152.0 
2016 94.0 300.4 118.8 168.7 139.7 263.3 2.48 0.051 181.0 
2017 95.9 252.8 111.1 176.1 148.0 293.1 5.81 0.001 180.6 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
Table 8 focuses upon revenues from transfers in 5 years for which such factorization of data was 
available. On average, Cluster 6 shows the highest transfers deriving from member municipalities 
of its UCs, whereas Cluster 2 presents the highest transfers from the region. Per capita transfers 
                                                 
28 Significance of t-test: with reference to Cluster 1: 10% in 2013, 5% in the 2014-2016 time span, 1% in 2017. With 
reference to Cluster 3: 5% in 2016, 1% in 2017. With reference to Cluster 5: 10% in 2016, 5% in 2017. 
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from the state are very low, highlighting the guiding role of the region, Italian middle level of 
government, in promoting and enhancing such cooperation between municipalities. However, dif-
ferences among clusters are significant only in 3 out of 5 years considered (significance at 10% for 
years 2013-2015), and only with reference to transfers from member municipalities. In this case, 
Cluster 1 has lower values of transfers from its own municipalities with respect to clusters with 
higher values of that variable (2 and 6) in almost all years considered.29 Transfers from municipal-
ities are lower for Cluster 3 with respect to Cluster 6, and differences are weakly statistically sig-
nificant in 2014 and 2015.30 
Table 8 – UCs revenues from transfers 2011-2015, per typology and cluster 
Year Variable 
Cluster 
F P-Value Total 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
2011 
From the Region 7.0 61.5 11.1 4.8 9.2 28.2 1.12 0.381 21.5 
From the State 1.4 0.9 2.0 4.2 1.9 1.0 0.45 0.812 1.5 
From Member Municipalities 13.4 78.3 36.2 71.3 15.9 87.1 1.02 0.428 54.6 
2012 
From the Region 8.1 53.7 10.6 10.3 10.5 30.6 0.89 0.501 21.5 
From the State 1.6 0.6 0.6 0.0 2.8 2.3 0.81 0.557 1.5 
From Member Municipalities 14.2 97.9 35.9 91.0 60.2 103.3 1.52 0.223 65.4 
2013 
From the Region 5.5 55.0 10.5 6.8 5.6 39.1 1.22 0.331 23.6 
From the State 1.2 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.4 1.4 0.60 0.701 1.5 
From Member Municipalities 18.0 163.0 50.8 127.1 44.2 126.5 2.19 0.090 85.9 
2014 
From the Region 5.9 16.6 11.6 45.9 27.0 45.8 1.84 0.133 25.5 
From the State 1.5 0.4 0.7 9.3 0.4 2.4 4.16 0.005 3.7 
From Member Municipalities 15.9 82.0 43.9 70.8 30.1 125.4 2.25 0.072 65.0 
2015 
From the Region 8.9 39.7 11.8 28.9 22.9 31.1 1.06 0.401 24.2 
From the State 2.3 0.4 1.5 5.6 1.8 3.6 0.94 0.470 4.5 
From Member Municipalities 21.2 88.8 52.7 26.4 49.2 132.8 2.14 0.086 70.4 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
                                                 
29 Significance of t-test: with reference to Cluster 2: 5% in the 2011-2013 time span. With reference to Cluster 6: 10% 
in 2012 and 2013, 5% in 2014 and 2015. 
30 Significance of t-test: 10% in 2014 and 2015. 
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7.1 Discussion 
In conclusion, we can state that municipalities increasingly relied on UCs as service providers and 
empowered their expenditures capability in last decades accordingly. At the same time, associa-
tions of municipalities have not been able to increase their own revenues. In addition, they gener-
ally decreased their own financial autonomy, relying on transfers from other public institutions. On 
average, Cluster 2 (Cozy Suburbs) and Cluster 6 (Ideal Types) have higher revenues from transfers 
and higher current expenditures per inhabitants; Cluster 6 constantly increased these values from 
2013 to 2017 and showed the highest increasing contribution from its own municipalities in terms 
of funding between 2011 and 2015. The power of Cluster 6 in terms of territorial socio-economic 
conditions goes beyond the institutional dimension. However, despite the highest total population 
among clusters (which lowers the per-capita financial values), the administrative features of Cluster 
6 (e.g. old UCs in the cluster, highest number of functions attributed to UCs by municipalities) are 
reinforced by financial decisions in terms of expenditures and revenues at the UCs level, strength-
ening the role of Ideal types UCs as autonomous and resilient service providers. Territories of 
Cluster 2, Cozy suburbs, even if characterized by fewer inhabitants and less economic dynamicity 
with respect to Cluster 6, share similar trends in terms of UCs financial indicators but a higher level 
of revenues from regional transfers. Cozy suburbs contain a low number of municipalities, but they 
jointly provide a high number of functions. Hence, these institutions seem a sustainable opportunity 
to overcome less favorable peripheral territorial conditions. Cluster 3 (Small good performers) and 
Cluster 4 (Sleeping beauties) share some financial dimension of Cluster 2 and 6 on a smaller scale. 
In these clusters, the smaller number of functions attributed to UCs lowers the financial indicators 
of our analysis. Finally, two distinctive behaviors characterize the most fragile territories, i.e. Clus-
ter 1 (Unlucky pioneers) and Cluster 5 (Hardship on the mountain). While the latter seems to re-
produce strong and resilient administrative cooperation of mountain territories (pre-existing con-
sortia) in new UCs, the former contains UCs with a long institutional history but with very low 
values of all financial indicators: in this sense these UCs do not seem strong enough to represent a 
structural delegated form of government. 
Our results are perfectly in line with the RDT stating that resource scarcity, not necessarily effi-
ciency, motivates organisational action (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Leblebici et al. 1991). Indeed, 
UCs verify all the main RDT propositions: (i) organisations are constrained by a network of inter-
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dependencies with other organisations; (ii) organisations adopt strategies to reduce their depend-
ency on other organisations’ resources in their environment; (iii) these dependencies produce inter-
organisational and intra-organisational power relations (Pfeffer 1987; Ulrich and Barney 1984). 
Hence, UCs seem to act as municipalities’ delegate aiming to reduce uncertainty through Inter-
Municipal Cooperation. Indeed, UCs reduce the dependence from other entities since they allow 
an inter-organisational alliance with the source of constraint (for instance with municipalities and 
regional government). In the view of municipalities’ policymakers, UCs may act as a new balance 
of power, i.e. an organisation that has an influence over resources needed by them. However, as 
our results show, this means that UCs seem far from becoming self-sustainable institutions. More-
over, considering clusters’ budget analysis, we concluded that strong socio-economic territorial 
conditions bring to strong inter-organizational alliances (UCs), in terms of expenditures and reve-
nues. This is clearly exemplified by strong institutions as Ideal Types or smaller but dynamic real-
ities as Cozy Suburbs. On the contrary, the idea that strong UCs compensate for weak territorial 
features is not self-evident and must be studied in deep. In fact, weak socio-economic and admin-
istrative territories seem to be left back with respect to other UCs in terms of autonomy, resilience 
and sustainability. 
8 Conclusions 
In this contribution we have distinguished Unioni di Comuni (UCs) of Emilia-Romagna Region 
into patterns on the basis of their socio-economic characteristics. Firstly, the results of our cluster-
ing procedure show 6 groups of association, which we labelled: Unlucky pioneers; Cozy suburbs; 
Small good performers; Sleeping beauties; Hardship on the mountains, and Ideal Types. This 
grouping confirms our previous idea about the characterisation of these institutions: a central dom-
inant group of institutions typical of the economic and administrative features of the region (Ideal 
Types), followed by a similar cluster with minor UCs (Small good performers), some very active 
and young UCs (Cozy suburbs), the mountain area characterised by high administrative complexity 
and economic weaknesses (Hardship on the mountains), some UCs with a long history of IMC but 
quite bad economic performance (Unlucky pioneers), and a final cluster with “residual” UCs which 
seem a little bit undefined (Sleeping Beauty). 
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Secondly, the analysis on budgets trends over time shows that UCs increased, on average, the cur-
rent per capita expenditures. At the same time, transfers from other institution also increased, but 
the financial autonomy of UCs decreased. Cluster 2 (Cozy Suburbs) and Cluster 6 (Ideal Types) 
have higher revenues from transfers per inhabitants and higher current expenditures per inhabit-
ants; Cluster 6 constantly increased these values from 2013 to 2017 and shows the highest increas-
ing contribution from its own municipalities in terms of funding between 2011 and 2015. Consid-
ering the most fragile territories, Cluster 1 (Unlucky pioneers) contains UCs with a long institu-
tional history but with very low values of all financial indicators: in this sense these UCs do not 
seem strong enough to represent a structural delegated form of government. On the contrary, Clus-
ter 5 (Hardship on the mountains) seems to reproduce strong administrative cooperation of moun-
tain territories (pre-existing consortia) in new UCs. 
Thus, our results show that there is a general tendency to provide services through Unioni di Co-
muni in E-R, and to empower and enhance their development in terms of public service speciali-
zation. In last decades, municipalities increasingly relied on UCs as service providers and empow-
ered their expenditures capability accordingly. At the same time, UCs generally decreased their 
own financial autonomy, relying more and more on transfers from other public institutions. 
This paper refers the preliminary results of the research, hence there are some weaknesses. These 
are related not only to the exploratory nature of the research, but also to the focus on a single 
instrument of IMC and on a specific region of a specific country. In addition, the identification of 
financial autonomy and sustainability indicators are still at a preliminary stage. Nevertheless, we 
started from the Italian region where a particular kind of IMC is very common, in order to have a 
better sample of the application of this instrument. 
In line with Resource-Dependence Theory (RDT), our empirical analysis finds different clusters 
of UCs which act as new centres for public service delivery in Emilia-Romagna Region. Their goal 
is to reduce uncertainty over resources, through the creation of new inter-organizational balances. 
However, the idea that strong UCs compensate weak starting territorial features of municipalities 
is not self-evident. Thus, future research at regional and national level should for instance investi-
gate whether territories with different socio-economic and administrative power can aspire to con-
vergence with other territories through Inter-Municipal Cooperation in the form of Unioni di Co-
muni. 
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11 Appendix 
Table A1 – Correlations between initial variables 
Variables 
Total  
population 
%  
Over 65 
%  
Foreigners 
Area Employees Density 
Total  
income 
Functions at-
tributed to 
UC 
N. of mu-
nicipalities 
Total population 1.000         
% Over 65 -0.309 1.000        
% Foreigners 0.091 -0.344 1.000       
Area 0.482 0.433 -0.223 1.000      
Employees 0.782 -0.321 0.312 0.213 1.000     
Density 0.538 -0.722 0.233 -0.392 0.490 1.000    
Total income 0.967 -0.284 0.128 0.431 0.809 0.534 1.000   
Functions  
attributed to UC 
0.313 -0.129 0.339 0.179 0.386 0.124 0.258 1.000  
N. of  
municipalities 
0.495 0.005 0.006 0.590 0.399 -0.031 0.479 0.162 1.000 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Table A2 – Results for the extraction of components 
Component Eigenvalue Proportion Cumulative 
1 3.83 0.43 0.43 
2 2.27 0.25 0.68 
3 1.14 0.13 0.80 
4 0.65 0.07 0.88 
5 0.52 0.06 0.93 
6 0.30 0.03 0.97 
7 0.21 0.02 0.99 
8 0.06 0.01 1.00 
9 0.02 0.00 1.00 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Figure A1 – Scree test for component analysis 
 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Table A3 – PCA components and correlations with initial variables 
Variables name 
PCA Components 
Economic and 
Administrative 
Dynamism 
Territorial Weakness 
and Extension 
Administrative 
Complexity 
Total population 0.482 0.114 -0.172 
% Population over 65 -0.236 0.478 0.119 
% Foreigners 0.157 -0.293 0.622 
Area 0.168 0.589 0.051 
Employees 0.452 -0.012 0.058 
Density 0.317 -0.430 -0.289 
Total income 0.478 0.099 -0.182 
Functions attributed to UC 0.228 0.005 0.669 
Number of municipalities 0.274 0.362 0.017 
Source: author’s elaboration 
Table A4 – Duda-Hart Index (2 to 20 partitions) 
Number of 
Clusters 
Duda/Hart 
Je(2)/Je(1) Pseudo T-squared 
2 0.620 18.37 
3 0.656 9.45 
4 0.451 12.16 
5 0.535 8.69 
6 0.594 6.84 
7 0.584 6.42 
8 0.177 13.97 
9 0.423 6.84 
10 0.519 5.56 
11 0.494 6.15 
12 0.354 10.95 
13 0.222 7.01 
14 0.106 8.47 
15 0.486 4.22 
16 0.470 3.38 
17 0.169 4.93 
18 0.057 16.61 
19 0.301 4.64 
20 0.488 3.14 
Source: author’s elaboration 
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Table A5 – List of UCs (Unioni di Comuni) per cluster, 6 clusters solution 
Cluster UCs Province 
1 
Unione di Comuni Bassa val d’Arda Fiume Po Piacenza 
Unione dei Comuni Bassa Val Trebbia e Val Luretta Piacenza 
Unione Colline Matildiche Reggio Emilia 
Unione della Valconca Rimini 
Unione dei Comuni “Savena-Idice” Bologna 
Unione Valnure e Valchero Piacenza 
2 
Unione Montana Appennino Parma Est Parma 
Unione Bassa Est Parmense Parma 
Unione dei Comuni della Via Emilia Piacentina Piacenza 
Unione Terra di Mezzo Reggio Emilia 
Unione Comuni Val Tidone Piacenza 
3 
Unione Alto Ferrarese Ferrara 
Unione Comuni del Sorbara Modena 
Unione Pedemontana Parmense Parma 
Unione Pianura Reggiana Reggio Emilia 
Unione Terre d’acqua Bologna 
Unione Comuni Terre di Pianura Bologna 
Unione Terre Verdiane Parma 
Unione Tresinaro Secchia Reggio Emilia 
Unione Val d’Enza Reggio Emilia 
4 
Unione Comuni Montani Alta Val d’Arda Piacenza 
Unione Comuni Montani Alta Val Nure Piacenza 
Unione dei Comuni del Delta del Po Ferrara 
Unione Montana dei Comuni della Val Trebbia e Val Luretta Piacenza 
Unione dei Comuni Terre e Fiumi Ferrara 
Unione dei Comuni Valli Taro Ceno Parma 
5 
Unione Comuni del Frignano Modena 
Unione dei Comuni dell’Appennino bolognese Bologna 
Unione Montana dei Comuni dell’Appennino Reggiano Reggio Emilia 
Unione dei Comuni Valle del Savio Forlì-Cesena 
Unione dei Comuni “Valli e Delizie” Ferrara 
Unione di Comuni Valmarecchia Rimini 
6 
Unione Bassa Reggiana Reggio Emilia 
Unione Comuni del Distretto Ceramico Modena 
Unione dei Comuni della Bassa Romagna Ravenna 
Unione della Romagna Faentina Ravenna 
Unione delle Terre d’Argine Modena 
Unione Comuni Modenesi Area Nord Modena 
Nuovo Circondario Imolese Bologna 
Unione Reno Galliera Bologna 
Unione Rubicone e Mare Forlì-Cesena 
Unione Terre di Castelli Modena 
Unione Valli del Reno, Lavino e Samoggia Bologna 
 
